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Market-based instruments (MBIs) for resource management create financial 
incentives for people and businesses to use resources more efficiently, within a 
regulatory context designed to ensure that ecological, social and cultural objectives 
are also met.  Three case studies were done to identify factors influencing the 
adoption or rejection of market-based instruments in New Zealand.  Case studies 
included Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) for New Zealand‟s inshore fisheries, 
Transferable Water Permits (TWPs) in Tasman District and Waikato Region, and 
charges for occupation of coastal space at both the national and regional levels in 
New Zealand.  This paper provides a summary of findings from these case studies.  
These include: MBIs are difficult to implement if they threaten the position of 
existing users.  It is important to have clear objectives.  Norms and values can be an 
obstacle to MBIs, especially where they help to protect the interests of key 
stakeholders, but value-based opposition can be overcome if practical concerns are 
addressed. 
Key  Words:  market-based  instruments,  ITQ,  transferable  water  permits,  coastal 
occupation charges 
 
1. Introduction and Context 
This paper reports some preliminary results from a research project, Institutions for 
Sustainable Development, which has as an objective “integrating the cost of natural 
resources into the market economy.”  Market-based instruments (MBIs) for resource 
management can help meet this objective, because they create financial incentives 
for people and businesses to use resources more efficiently, within a regulatory 
context designed to ensure that ecological, social and cultural objectives are also met.  
Examples include property rights that are tradeable or transferable in the marketplace 
and charges for the „use‟ of environmental goods or services. 
 
The research project aims to identify obstacles to the implementation of MBIs so that 
they can be more easily adopted where appropriate.  To this end, three New Zealand 
case studies were done to explore the implementation of market-based instruments: 
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  Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) for New Zealand fisheries. 
  Transferable water permits (TWPs) in Tasman District and Waikato Region 
(Fenemor and Sinner, 2005). 
  Charges for occupation of coastal space (Palmer et al, 2005a). 
 
This paper summarizes the findings from these case studies.   
 
As originally envisaged, the focus of these case studies was to be on the information 
available to decision-makers when they decided whether to adopt or reject market-
based instruments, the factors that led to the decision for or against and, where 
possible, subsequent information on the resulting outcomes from the instruments.   
 
As part of the preparation for these case studies, we explored a number of theories 
that might help to explain the behaviour of decision-makers in agencies and 
government, in terms of how they could be expected to respond to any comparative 
assessment of options.  Of particular relevance to the discussion in this paper are 
rational choice theory, collective action theory, principal-agent theory and cultural 
theory.  These and other theories of possible relevance are summarised in Palmer et 
al (2005b). 
 
As the case studies proceeded, it became clear that issues concerning political 
responses to stakeholder interests, and to a lesser extent instrument design, were 
more important than the robustness of the assessment of MBIs vs other options.  
Thus, our findings focus mostly on how the proposed instruments were perceived by 
key stakeholders, how they reacted, and how politicians responded in making a 
decision whether to proceed with the MBI under consideration.  In most cases, there 
was little formal comparative assessment conducted by policy advisors on MBI 
proposals and policy alternatives.   
 
2. ITQ for New Zealand fisheries
4 
2.1  Background to the case study 
After a period of expansion, fuelled in part by subsidies, New Zealand‟s fisheries 
were in crisis by the late 1970s and early 1980s.  There was pressure on the 
Government to approve the importation of more deepwater fishing vessels, although 
there was limited room for more fishing capacity.  Meanwhile, inshore fish stocks 
had been depleted by a fleet that was over-capitalised.   
 
The deepwater fishery consisted of a small number (less than ten) of relatively large 
New Zealand companies and their foreign joint venture partners.  The Government 
resolved the competition to introduce more vessels in 1983 by granting transferable 
quotas to each company based on their existing investment in the fishery. 
 
Consultation on the future of the inshore fisheries during 1983 was followed by a 
period of indecision by the Government.  After a snap election in 1984, the Labour 
Government moved quickly to advance the option of ITQs, for which support in the 
                                                 
4  This section summarises findings of Sinner and Fenemor (2005). fishing industry had been growing.  Both Government and industry leaders saw ITQ 
as the best way to restructure the industry and protect fish stocks for the longer term.  
By November 1984, a policy package based on ITQ was put to the fishing industry, 
and by May 1985 Cabinet had confirmed the decision to proceed.  Parliament 
enacted the authorising legislation in July 1986 and ITQ commenced for the main 
inshore fisheries on 1 October 1986. 
2.2 Key factors in the adoption of ITQ 
Based on interviews with key players involved in the ITQ decisions, and analysis of 
public discussion documents, Cabinet papers, and other material, the following were 
identified as key factors that led to the adoption of ITQ as the long-term management 
regime for New Zealand‟s inshore fisheries: 
 
  The presence of a crisis that required a change in management and the 
absence of any other viable option to address the crisis 
  Instrument design that protected the position of existing fishers, including the 
government‟s willingness to compensate for catch reductions 
  Early collaboration between government and industry officials and early 
support from key leaders in the fishing industry 
  Successful implementation of a precursor to ITQs in the deepwater fishery 
  A consultation process that provided ample opportunity for fishers‟ questions 
and concerns to be heard 
  The commitment of the Labour Government to reform and its consequent 
firmness that compensation would only be provided in conjunction with 
structural reform based on ITQ. 
Fishing industry leaders supported ITQ, albeit with some reservations, because they 
could see it was the only real option that would both enable restructuring of the 
industry and protect the stocks on which they relied, while protecting the position of 
existing full-time fishers.  The status quo was not an attractive option. 
ITQ was the only option proposed by Government that provided funding to reduce 
the catch effort.  The Government-funded restructuring scheme for the inshore 
fisheries was to be implemented via ITQ allocations, with effort reduction on a 
voluntary basis.  Thus, the new management regime did not deny any existing fishers 
access to the resource.  
Part-time fishers were excluded at the behest of the fishing industry and with the 
support of officials, as an interim measure, well before a consensus emerged about 
ITQ for the inshore fisheries.  They could be excluded because they were not 
organised and had little political influence. 
Much was made by some interviewees of the significance of the political and 
economic context of the mid-1980s.  While the context of 1984 was obviously 
conducive to ITQs, it is not clear that it was either necessary or sufficient for ITQs to 
emerge.  In our view, the support of the fishing industry was critical, and this was 
possible because ITQs did not threaten to displace from the fishery any politically 
significant groups.  In addition, the early experience of transferable quota in the deep 
sea fishery had not raised any significant problems or concerns.  
3. Transferable water permits
5  
3.1  Background to the case study 
Administration of water management under the Resource Management Act is largely 
devolved to regional councils and unitary authorities which, subject to any national 
standards and policy statements from central government, decide how to allocate 
water and how to protect water quality.  This case study explored decisions on the 
transferability of water permits by Environment Waikato (a regional council) and 
Tasman District Council (a unitary authority). 
 
Regional councils and unitary authorities are directly elected from the regions, many 
of which, such as Tasman, are quite small.  These governance arrangements confer a 
relatively high level of influence on user groups affected within each region. 
 
Under the Resource Management Act, consents to take water from rivers or 
groundwater reservoirs can be transferred to another site upon application to the 
relevant regional council.  This is generally equivalent to a new consent application 
for a discretionary activity, which typically takes a month or two to process and 
possibly considerably longer if there are objections.   
 
However, regional councils can enhance the transferability of water permits by 
including rules in their regional plans that make transfers controlled or permitted 
activities, subject to conditions, with no or only limited opportunity for other parties 
to object.  This enables transfers to be confirmed within a matter of weeks or even 
days.  In this paper, we use the term transferable water permits (TWPs) to describe 
permits for which transferability has been enhanced in this way by regional plans. 
 
Both Environment Waikato (EW) and Tasman District Council (TDC) have taken 
decisions in the last several years regarding the transferability of permits to take 
water.  EW included provision for TWPs in the proposed Waikato Regional Plan, 
although this provision was appealed by NZ Fish & Game Council and has yet to be 
implemented.  TDC, in contrast, after a more intensive process of investigation and 
consultation, decided against including TWPs in its regional plan.  More recently, 
however, TDC has approved enhanced transferability of permits in a small catchment 
where water supplies are to be augmented via a storage scheme. 
3.2    Environment Waikato 
In late 1995 and early 1996, EW processed multiple consent applications to take 
water from the Waihou River.  Transferability of these consents was discussed 
amongst officials, users and submitters, with various viewpoints discussed, although 
the issue was outside the scope of the consent hearings.  According to interview 
responses, this experience shaped the thinking of key EW staff as the Waikato 
Regional Plan (WRP) was being developed. 
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status quo” option, with some enhanced transferability of water permits where “there 
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The TWP provision in the proposed WRP drew a number of submissions.  A local 
environmental group objected on philosophical grounds, while Fish & Game sought 
some technical changes.  Water users were generally supportive and some users even 
sought to extend the scope of the transferability provision, e.g. to groundwater and to 
upstream as well as downstream transfers.   
 
At hearings in 2000, we have identified only two submitters that commented on the 
TWP provision.  One, an agribusiness consultancy, wanted some constraints on 
TWPs removed, and a councillor engaged in discussion with the submitter on the 
details of this point.  An environmental group opposed the provision, but elicited no 
comment from councillors. 
 
In deciding submissions, with the benefit of a recent drought to bring issues into 
sharper focus, EW confirmed the TWP provision with only minor changes.  EW 
declined Fish & Game‟s submission for some further restrictions on transfers, and 
Fish & Game appealed to the Environment Court.  The appeal has yet to be resolved 
as EW has been focussing on resolving appeals on other issues and on rewriting its 
water allocation provisions more generally, and hence the transferability provision 
remains inoperative. 
3.3    Tasman District Council 
The Tasman District Council (TDC) has considered the adoption of TWPs on a 
number of occasions over the past decade as water bodies in its region became fully 
allocated.  In response to the enabling provisions of the RMA, TWPs were 
considered as a policy option in 1993. After rather polarised response from 
submitters (mostly irrigators), the Council indicated in its regional policy statement 
only that it would further investigate the matter.    
 
In 1997 the TDC released another discussion paper regarding TWPs.  Several public 
meetings were held and there was a report back to the Environment and Planning 
Committee summarising stakeholders‟ response.  Again, however, in view of 
ambivalence of some stakeholders and opposition from others, the Council chose not 
to proceed even with a trial that had been suggested. 
During the preparation of the Tasman Resource Management Plan (TRMP) the issue 
was revisited.  In response to a staff paper in June 2000 that outlined pros and cons 
of TWPs (but was less than a full integrated assessment), the Environment and 
Planning Committee resolved not to investigate TWPs further.  In March 2001, the 
draft water chapter of the TRMP retained the status quo under the default provisions 
of the RMA.   
 
During this time (i.e. from 2000), the Wai-iti Water Augmentation Committee 
(WWAC) was discussing how best to fund and implement a project to store water that would be used to augment flows to solve chronic over-allocation in the Wai-iti 
Valley.  The committee, which included irrigators as well as council representatives, 
eventually agreed to incorporate TWPs as a controlled activity, and to drop the “use-
it-or-lose-it” policy, in their proposals for the project area.  In this case, TWPs were 
seen as an alternative to “use-it-or-lose-it” for re-allocating existing water usage 
rights, and as a mechanism that also provided economic incentives to increase 
efficiency of water use. 
 
Corresponding changes to the TRMP were publicly notified by TDC on 24 April 
2004; four submissions were received, with only one opposed.  A hearing was held 
on 1 September 2004, with the staff recommending no changes to the proposal, and 
the changes have since taken effect. 
 
The circumstances in the Wai-iti were different than the Council had previously 
considered.  In its earlier decisions, TWPs were being considered in the context of 
fully allocated or over-allocated resources.  But there was no major stakeholder 
group pressing for change.  Water users were mostly satisfied with the status quo, 
and there were no identified potential users seeking new permits.  Some users, at 
least, realised that TWP could lead to more frequent rationing if unused permits were 
transferred and then used more fully.   
 
In the Wai-iti, users could see that the existing situation was not sustainable and that 
transferability would not threaten their security of supply because there would be 
plenty of water once the augmentation scheme was implemented.  Thus, the merits of 
TWPs as perceived by irrigators were quite different from the earlier case.  The 
support from irrigators, and lack of any real opposition, meant that some councillors 
did not focus on the details of the proposal.  When one councillor was interviewed in 
November 2004, she said she did not support TWPs and was not aware that enhanced 
transferability was part of the Wai-iti proposals the Council had recently approved. 
3.4    Key factors influencing adoption of TWPs 
In both TDC decisions, it appears that the views of existing water users were of 
paramount importance to the political decision-makers.  At EW water users did not 
take a strong position early on, although their support for the TWP provision post-
notification clearly helped ensure its retention.  While EW consulted widely, and 
managed to get most stakeholders on side with its proposals, it failed to consult 
sufficiently “deeply” with Fish & Game on this provision.  This had its price when 
Fish & Game appealed, rendering the TWP provision inoperative. 
 
Overall, given the devolved governance arrangements, we can say that TWPs are 
unlikely to be implemented without the support of water users, or at their least non-
opposition.  Given the lack of other strong reasons or political pressure for using 
TWPs, this policy instrument would probably not have been approved in either 
Tasman or Waikato if the major water users had been opposed.  Indeed, TWPs were 
initially rejected in Tasman, until new circumstances emerged that led a group of 
water users to support implementation of increased transferability. 
 
There were probably some distinct differences in the nature of the two councils as 
well, in terms of the degree of involvement of councillors and the amount of 
decision-making left to staff.  Also, water allocation is much more significant in the Tasman local economy than it is in Waikato, and hence the issue has more political 
prominence in Tasman.  So it is not surprising that some TDC councillors (from 
wards where irrigation was particularly important) took a relatively closer interest in 
the matter than did EW councillors.  Also in the TDC case, the in-depth evaluation of 
pros and cons of TWP may have created the impression that TWPs involved a major 
policy shift that, because of the uncertain outcome, heightened the risk aversion by 
councillors. 
4. Coastal occupation charges
6 
4.1  Background to the case study 
The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) attempted to reform what was 
previously a regime for coastal management governed by several different statutes.  
Among other things, the RMA provided for coastal occupation charges to be set by 
regulation, collected by regional councils and paid to the Crown.  „Occupation‟ 
means activities in the coastal marine area, such as marine farming, jetties, and 
moorings, which exclude other uses.   It appears the practicalities of implementation 
were never considered and charging provisions were included in the Act as a matter 
of principle. 
 
Attempts to set coastal occupation charges by regulation met with fierce opposition 
from boat owners in particular, but also from regional councils, who had to confront 
the public opposition to charges yet would have to pass the revenue that they 
collected on to the Crown.  The Government responded by commissioning a former 
MP, Wayne Kimber, to review the issue in 1994.  Kimber recommended that the 
RMA be amended to allow regional councils to set and collect charges themselves 
and retain the revenue.  Against the advice of most officials, the Government agreed 
and amended the RMA accordingly, although the amendment was not enacted until 
December 1997.  Councils were also given the option of not collecting coastal 
charges, but had to justify their decision one way or the other through their regional 
coastal plan. 
 
Since then there has been little progress made by regional councils.  Southland 
Regional Council had consistently been the only authority to collect the charges for 
the Crown during the initial phase under the RMA, on the same basis they had since 
the days of the Harbours Act, and so had little problem in continuing under the new 
legislation.  Other councils, particularly in northern New Zealand with larger 
numbers of boat users, who had for so long either not collected rentals or done so in 
a haphazard manner, found the new legislative requirements politically difficult.  
Faced with the considerable time and cost of developing a mechanism, then notifying 
and consulting using the First Schedule process, and then defending it under appeal, 
councils have been hesitant.  None have notified new provisions for charging (or not 
charging) under their regional coastal plans. 
4.2  Key factors leading to implementation failure 
Going into the interviews, our principle hypothesis was that coastal occupation 
charges have never been properly implemented in New Zealand because many users 
of New Zealand‟s coastal space consider the area to be an inalienable „common‟ 
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of coastal space (particularly for recreation) to be abhorrent. This culturally inherited 
view has made the imposition and collection of rentals for the exclusive occupation 
of public space, by the Crown owner, extremely controversial and difficult. 
 
Interviews suggested this is indeed the case, but probably only for the minority of 
New Zealanders who actually occupy the coast, such as boat owners. All 
interviewees conceded, at least to some extent, that charging was controversial and 
politically difficult due to users perceptions of the sanctity of free use arising from 
collective ownership.  We can use cultural theory to explain some of this, but it can 
also be argued that simple rational self-interest drives people‟s desire to see the coast 
as something they can exploit for nothing. However, the significant finding of our 
research in this respect is that this is only part of the story.  
 
Failed implementation of coastal charges was also the result of classic principal-
agent problems.  The agents, in this case local government, had differing objectives, 
as well as an unwillingness and insufficient technical capability to operate a 
collection regime.  By driving a universal policy from the centre, central government 
did not have the flexibility to deal with differing circumstances in varying locations, 
further undermining the efficacy of, and support for, the regime. 
 
The Kimber Review‟s public consultations encouraged typical collective action 
processes to derail policy and allowed particular interests to prevail over wider 
community interests.  The Review served to illustrate, by their absence, the potential 
value of allied NGOs, who were insufficiently active in this debate. 
 
Implementation difficulties throughout the last 15 years were exacerbated by 
ambiguous and poorly drafted legislation, which created the risk that public policy 
would be determined in the courts and therefore hampered implementers.  
Furthermore, the charging regime was not well located within the broader policy 
context and reinforced by the overall management regime.  Rather, it was tacked on 
as something of an afterthought in the RMA 1991 and a series of attempts to fix it 
have failed to remedy the fundamental problems. 
 
5. Main findings 
From the three case studies, several conclusions can be drawn.  Most, if not all, of 
these conclusions would apply to any type of new policy, not just market-based 
instruments.   
 
  Existing users of a resource tend to dominate political consideration of MBI 
proposals – to alter the status quo policy framework, there must be a clear need 
for change or risks to existing users need to be addressed.  
ITQ for fisheries and TWPs in the Wai-iti catchment of Tasman District are 
examples where the need for change provided the opportunity for market-based 
instruments to be considered and adopted.  In the case of the failure to implement 
coastal charges, the lack of a pressing need for change enabled those with a vested 
interest in the status quo to block implementation of the MBI that was perceived as 
threatening their interests.  Tasman District‟s earlier decision against TWPs also reflects the lack of a clear need for change, as existing users resisted the uncertainty 
TWPs entailed and this was communicated to the political decision-makers.  In all of 
these cases, the wider public took little or no active interest in the outcomes of these 
considerations, thereby enabling the interests of existing users to be the dominant 
force in the decisions taken, as predicted by the theory of collective action (see 
Palmer et al, 2005). 
Environment Waikato included TWPs in its regional plan despite the absence of any 
clear need for change.  In this case, EW staff considered that TWPs presented clear 
benefits (albeit potential benefits, given that there was not a significant unmet 
demand for water) and supported this change.  The fact that no major stakeholders 
raised significant objections enabled the Council to approve it.  However, although 
Fish & Game had not raised significant objections in the consultation and hearing 
process, it appealed the decision, presumably because it concluded its interests were 
not fully protected, rendering the TWP provision inoperative pending resolution of 
the appeal.  The issue has not been a high priority for EW, and the appeal remains 
unresolved.  In a sense, then, this supports the conclusion that MBIs are difficult to 
implement if they threaten the position of existing users, unless there is a clear need 
for change. 
Complete protection of existing users is not always necessary.  In 2003, the Minister 
of Fisheries decided to bring tuna and other associated species into the Quota 
Management System.  Quota was allocated on the basis of catch history in a way that 
protected most fishers, but inevitably some got less quota than they considered 
necessary to maintain their current fishing practices.  In addition, the Minister 
decided not to give tuna fishers preferential access to quota for swordfish, which is a 
common bycatch species in the longline tuna fishery, nominally a non-commercial 
species (not to be targeted) but in reality an important component of tuna fishers‟ 
incomes.  
Possible explanations for the Minister‟s decision include perceptions that some 
fishers were targeting swordfish illegally, the financial loss to the government if the 
swordfish quota were given away and interest in swordfish from recreational fishers.  
Conversely, tuna fishers were concerned that the value of their tuna quota could be 
lost if they are forced to pay high prices for the right to catch swordfish.  
Nevertheless, these concerns did not prevent the Minister of Fisheries from bringing 
these species into the quota system without accommodating existing users‟ concerns 
on this point.  This outcome may reflect the relatively greater political strength of the 
Minister as centralised decision-maker in this case, i.e. less vulnerability to criticism 
from a group of existing resource users, compared with the position of elected 
regional councillors in the water permit cases. 
MBIs can also be implemented in a way that protects existing users in the short to 
medium term by allocating rights based on historical use, but claws back these rights 
over time.  For example, in the Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme in Australia 
salinity discharge rights were allocated to existing dischargers for an initial period, 
but these expire over time and new rights have to be purchased at auction (Sinner and 
Salmon, 2003).   
The current debate about allocation of nitrogen discharge credits in the Lake Taupo 
catchments could be resolved in a similar way.  There, farmers seek protection of existing farm management practices while forest owners seek an allocation based on 
averaging across the catchment that will allow them some scope for development or 
at least recognise that they have not contributed to the nutrient accumulation in the 
lake.  One possible resolution would be to grant farmers discharge rights for an initial 
period but for these to expire over time and go into a pool that would be available to 
forest owners. 
  Clear objectives are essential. 
This conclusion arises primarily from the experience with coastal charging.  The 
Government was not clear whether it was seeking to charge resource rentals for the 
use of public space, to ration coastal space amongst competing users, or to recover 
costs associated with coastal management.  It blurred this distinction because of legal 
uncertainty over ownership of the seabed.  The lack of a clear objective led to 
problems in instrument design and made it difficult to persuade existing users and the 
wider public that charging for coastal space was appropriate. The lack of a clear 
objective also makes it difficult to carry out a reasonable assessment of effects – 
hence the difficulty in persuading stakeholders of the appropriateness of the 
proposal. 
 
The fisheries and water case studies also support this conclusion, which is in fact 
closely linked to the first conclusion.  A clear need for change helps to provide focus 
for the objective of the policy, and this was evident in the cases where MBIs were 
successfully implemented. 
 
  Instrument design does not need to be perfect, but it needs to be sufficiently 
advanced to achieve acceptance by stakeholders.  Theoretical inspiration must 
be accompanied by practical feasibility. 
The coastal charging study demonstrates the dangers of trying to implement a new 
instrument without a sufficiently advanced proposal of how the instrument will 
operate in practice (which is of course difficult without clear objectives).  Those 
potentially affected will oppose the instrument if they perceive that it threatens their 
position, so they need at least enough information to judge its likely effects.  The 
experience with TWPs reinforces this point – the proposals were not sufficiently 
detailed or explained in sufficient detail for stakeholders to have confidence in them.  
In the Tasman case, irrigators felt threatened, whereas in the Waikato it was Fish & 
Game that felt threatened.  In the latter case at least, better communication would 
probably have resolved the matter, but because the issue was of lesser importance 
than other issues in the Waikato Regional Plan, that did not happen. 
 
The fisheries case provides an excellent example of instrument design being 
sufficiently advanced to satisfy stakeholders, even though the design was far from 
perfect and, indeed, is still being refined twenty years later.  The Blue Book 
consultation document clearly described the main features of ITQ and the process for 
compensating fishers for reductions in quota to achieve sustainable harvest levels.  
This document then served as the basis for an intensive round of further consultation 
with fishers, who were persuaded by industry leaders and the proposal‟s own 
inherent logic to support ITQ. 
 New Zealand‟s experience with ITQ also demonstrates it is not necessary to have 
perfect instrument design from the outset.  Indeed, attempting to achieve perfection 
could well be fatal to a proposal. The design needs to be sufficiently advanced to 
address the key concerns of major stakeholders who could block implementation.  
Beyond that, governments must be prepared to take a leap of faith, to make mistakes 
and to revise and improve the instrument over time.  
 
It must also be acknowledged, however, that once an instrument has been 
implemented, changes often face resistance.  The Ministry of Fisheries, for instance, 
has been unable to eliminate many obsolete regulations because of opposition from 
fishing companies that have made investment decisions based on various gear and 
area restrictions.  The fact that local authorities in New Zealand have to implement 
market-based instruments through the Resource Management Act 1991, with its 
time-consuming consultation and appeal provisions, makes it more difficult to refine 
an instrument over time. 
 
  Choice of instrument can also be critical to successful implementation. 
Economic theory provides guidance on when a given type of MBI is likely to be 
most efficient.  To simplify somewhat, a quantity instrument (such as transferable 
quotas or water permits) is appropriate when a fixed resource needs to be rationed 
amongst competing users, whereas a price instrument (such as a charge for use of a 
resource) is appropriate for addressing externalities of resource use where the actual 
quantity of resource use is of less importance.   
 
Political theory and evidence from the three case studies provide somewhat different 
guidance.  Quantity instruments can be easier to introduce because they can be more 
readily designed to accommodate existing users.  From a political perspective, 
charges are more feasible when there is a very large number of users and hence a 
quantity instrument is simply not practical for administrative reasons.  Examples 
include the price differential imposed on leaded petrol during its phase-out in New 
Zealand, local charges for reticulated water supply and for solid waste disposal in 
several New Zealand cities, and the proposed carbon charge planned for 2007.  Wide 
coverage also makes it harder for small groups to plead for protection of existing 
uses, though not impossible as the carbon charge proposal has also shown.   
 
  To get the support of existing users and other key groups for implementation of 
MBIs, it is important to get sector leaders on board. 
The fisheries case again provided the best example of this.  Staff of the Fishing 
Industry Board, along with a few government officials, were the early promoters of 
ITQ as a possible solution to the crisis facing New Zealand‟s inshore fisheries.  Once 
the proposals were developed, industry leaders, especially among the large number 
of independent owner-operator fishers, were instrumental in obtaining support for 
ITQ from fishers. 
 
The Tasman TWP study provides equally compelling evidence of the importance of 
key stakeholders.  The current system of water user committees and close contact 
between those committees and Council staff/councillors means the present system is 
widely supported.  Potential new users are not represented in those discussions.  This meant the status quo was well entrenched when the Council rejected TWP for the 
Waimea Basin.  Yet in the Wai-iti, water users saw the benefits of being able to 
transfer water allocations within an augmented water supply that they were paying 
for, and at the same time get rid of the unpopular „use it or lose it‟ policy on water 
allocations.  In this case the Council, seeing the water user support, confirmed the 
Wai-iti TWP proposal with little additional scrutiny.   
 
  Resource constraints are often closely linked to social and economic issues. 
Resource use creates social and economic outcomes, therefore changes to policy for 
resource management should account for those social and economic consequences.  
In cases where resources have become limited, such as fisheries and water, the 
prospect of government action such as clawback with or without compensation can 
be a powerful motivator for the acceptance of proposed policy changes.  Even where 
resources have not yet become limited, as in the coastal occupation example, the 
effects of an MBI proposal on the social and economic landscape needs 
consideration, alongside the political landscape. 
 
  It is best to emphasise practical implications of MBIs rather than their 
theoretical elegance. 
Growing scepticism in recent years about “market reforms” has led politicians and 
stakeholders to be suspicious of “market-based” policies.  In Tasman District, we 
encountered both councillors and stakeholders who were critical of New Zealand‟s 
electricity market reforms and of the corporatisation of ENZA, which had been a 
marketing board controlled by producers of apples and other pipfruit.   
 
The ITQ for fisheries possibly provides a counter-example, in that respondents said 
that a presentation by an American academic of the theory of ITQs, rather than their 
practical implementation, was influential in persuading fishing industry personnel 
and government officials to give ITQ serious consideration.  The mid-1980s was a 
period of much greater receptivity to market-based reforms than today, however.  In 
any event, when the proposals were put to fishers, the discussion documents focused 
on practical details rather than economic theory. 
 
  If implementation is devolved to another agency or agencies, it is important to 
ensure that objectives of the implementing agency are aligned with the 
authorising agency. 
This is a key lesson from principal-agent theory, and was borne out by the coastal 
charging case study.  Central government decided that it wanted coastal charges 
(though was unclear whether these were to be rentals or charges for services 
provided) but, when implementation proved politically and administratively difficult, 
decided to devolve implementation to regional councils.  But councils‟ interests were 
not aligned with the Government‟s, not least because the councils did not stand to 
benefit from any of the revenue collected.  Government then tried to address this by 
allowing councils to keep the revenue, but councils still faced other costs that 
hindered the implementation of coastal charges.  
   Norms and values can be an obstacle to MBIs, especially where they help to 
protect the interests of key stakeholders, but value-based opposition can be 
overcome if practical concerns are addressed. 
Norms and values are institutions for management of natural resources, just as formal 
rules and regulations are.  They develop over time to support and control resource 
use in a way that meets, at least to a certain extent, society‟s multiple objectives with 
regard to the resource.  Examples of such norms include: 
 
o  Irrigators should not apply water by overhead spray on hot, windy days. 
o  New Zealand‟s coastline and freshwater resources are for everyone to 
enjoy and share, free of charge. 
o  All New Zealanders are entitled to go fishing to get a feed for their 
families. 
o  New users of resources should not undermine existing uses. 
 
Connor (2004) noted that, in the voluminous literature on common pool resources, 
there is little recognition that changes in the way resources are managed might 
require a change of values.  Rather, “social defenders” often argue that property 
rights solutions, for example ITQ for fisheries, will lead to social change and should 
be resisted for that reason.  
 
However, as technology changes, norms and values do not always adapt quickly 
enough, and resources can become stressed.  Indeed, some values can come into 
conflict as resources become fully or over-allocated, and existing users seek to 
prevent new uses from being approved to protect their security of access. 
 
Nonetheless, many people attempt to maintain their value-based positions, which 
have in the past served society reasonably well.  New institutions, especially if these 
are based on seemingly contradictory values, will be resisted until such time as 
people are convinced that the new institutional arrangements will work satisfactorily.  
And as the new arrangements are seen to work, values and norms gradually adjust to 
the new set of institutions. 
 
The Tasman case study provided evidence of this phenomenon.  In the mid-1990s, 
when TWPs were under consideration for a substantial area of the Waimea Plains, 
some of the opposition was couched in “value” terms.  Some stakeholders were 
opposed to using markets to allocate water because it was a public resource that 
should be available to all, and because markets tend to be dominated by people with 
money rather than those who would make “best use” of the resource.  Yet when 
TWPs were proposed as part of the arrangements for funding water storage in the 
Wai-iti catchment, and stakeholders were no longer threatened by the change, these 
value-based concerns were nowhere in evidence.  
 
One important caveat to this conclusion must be noted.  The case studies did not 
provide evidence concerning the adaptability of deeply-held cultural values, such as 
those held by many Maori, that are part of a religious or spiritual world-view. 
 
An example would be the Maori belief that there is a unique mauri (or life force) in 
each distinct water body and the corresponding Maori norm that waters from different catchments should not be mixed, which probably had a practical function in 
traditional Maori life.  Concerns arising from these norms could perhaps be 
ameliorated if a new institutional arrangement could be shown to achieve the same 
function, or if the purpose was no longer relevant to modern life.  In such a case, the 
traditional norm might gradually give way to the modern institutional arrangements.   
 
However, experience in New Zealand suggests that, at least in the case of mixing 
waters, the original practical purpose has become embedded within cultural and 
spiritual holistic explanations, and those explanations now have their own 
psychological functions, creating continued resistance to change.  The pre-conditions 
for acceptance of change have not been met, or the change is happening very slowly, 
or the hypothesis simply does not hold for norms based on deeply-held spiritual and 
religious beliefs.  Exploring the adaptability of these deeply-held norms and values 
was beyond the scope of this study, but would warrant investigation in the future.  
Solutions may lie within the psychology of change, trust, and community. 
 
  Well-designed consultation is an important element of assessment of 
alternatives and can assist in successful implementation. 
 
Consultative methods are essential to proper assessments of effects, i.e. there is a link 
between good assessment and the use of such insights in marshalling opinions and 
managing support or opposition.  Assessment procedures are generally most useful 
when applied during the design stage of a policy proposal – they provide 
stakeholders an opportunity for input to instrument design, and thereby create the 
opportunity for informed buy-in and commitment to the proposal.  Of the cases we 
studied, the MBIs that were successfully implemented, fisheries ITQ and TWPs in 
Wai-iti, involved close consultation with stakeholders, not just in the design stage but 
earlier as well.  The proposal for TWPs in Waikato also involved considerable 
consultation with stakeholders, but the lack of consultation at the final stages 
contributed to non-implementation. 
 
While consultation in these cases was not undertaken as part of a formal assessment 
of the MBI vs. alternatives, the consultation process did assist officials and decision-
makers to identify concerns about the possible effects of the MBI and to address 
these concerns in the instrument design. 
 
Because systematic integrated assessment has not been the norm for policy 
proposals, particularly at regional and local government levels, the choice of whether 
or not to adopt MBIs has been more open to influence by the presence/absence of a 
crisis and the interests of existing users rather than the wider interests of the public 
and potential users.  That is not to say that the process of assessment will sideline 
political factors – far from it.  However, the lack of wider public participation in 
debates on the MBIs studied could have been a reflection on the way in which 
consultation was done, rather than a true lack of interest by the public.   
 
Assessment processes could make the decision-making process more accessible and 
understandable to more people, and enable them to see the links between resource 
constraints and social and economic issues.  This could then provide the basis for a 
well-informed debate that recognises a broad range of viewpoints and interests and 
concludes that a change to some alternative set of arrangements is clearly beneficial to most parties – both in terms of overall gains/losses as well as the distribution of 
these gains and losses. 
 
6. Efficiency, equity and politics 
The three case studies of proposals for MBIs identified a number of factors that 
influenced whether the proposals were adopted and implementation was successful.  
These range from the critical importance of existing users in the political process to 
the importance of clear objectives, including alignment between agencies where 
implementation is devolved.   
 
The need to address the interests and concerns of existing users could be seen as 
allowing a small group to capture the political process, at the expense of the wider 
public interest, resulting in “inequitable” outcomes.  Equity, however, tends to be 
viewed differently depending on one‟s situation.   
 
Existing users tend to argue that it would be unfair to exclude them from a resource, 
especially where they have made significant investments based on existing policy 
arrangements.  Public interest groups, on the other hand, tend to argue that users have 
no legitimate basis to assume continued access to public resources, that society 
creates property rights and therefore can alter them if it deems that a change would 
serve society better, and that the public has a right to some return for the private 
exclusive use of public resources.  These competing claims must be resolved through 
the political process.    
 
Economic efficiency, strictly defined as pareto optimality, requires that no one can 
be made better off without someone else being made worse off.  In a political 
context, this corresponds to a requirement for consensus (i.e. if someone would be 
worse off as a result of a policy change, they would not grant their consent).  The 
attempt by political decision-makers to resolve competing interests in natural 
resources, e.g. when considering implementation of an MBI, can be seen in a similar 
light.  For a political decision-maker, a proposal is clearly “good” if it leaves at least 
some people better off and no one worse off (see Sinner et al, 2004). 
 
However, if a proposal would leave a large number of people better off by a small 
amount, and a small number of people worse off by a large amount, there is not an 
obvious “right” decision about whether the proposal would improve public welfare, 
even if the total gains substantially exceed the total losses, because distribution 
matters.  Collective action theory suggests that politicians will usually reject such a 
proposal because the potential losers will be more active politically than the potential 
winners, and this was borne out by our case studies.   
 
It is possible, but far from certain, that better assessment of alternatives, including 
better consultation with all affected parties, would make such trade-offs more 
transparent and thereby facilitate action by public interest groups on behalf of the 
wider public interest.  The decision would still require political judgement, but 
arguably on a more transparent and informed basis.  Nevertheless, collective action 
theory suggests that politicians will continue to be more concerned about those 
subject to potential losses than those who stand to gain, and there is some basis for 
this in the concepts of both efficiency and equity.  An assessment process that identifies explicitly the nature and extent of losses, and where the losses lie, also 
provides a basis on which to develop mitigation strategies (including compensation) 
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